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Denying Access to Justice During a
Carceral Crisis
Brett Dignam1

Enthusiasm for punishment has given America an unprecedented and uncomfortable position
as the quintessential carceral state. As some states find themselves spending more tax dollars on
incarceration than higher education2 and new studies reveal the dire psychiatric consequences
of holding tens of thousands of people in extreme social isolation,3 talk of reform is building.
Proponents of reform advocate a shift to strategies aimed at alternatives to incarceration, as well
as reducing the use of long mandatory minimum sentences and providing opportunities to those
leaving our prisons in an effort to stem the tide of recidivism. But the U.S. continues to incarcerate
at a higher rate than any other country. For the more than 1.5 million people who remain in U.S.
prisons,4 access to justice is often an illusion.
Prisoners seek access to the justice system for two basic things – relief from an unconstitutional
conviction and relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Federal courts have
long been the ultimate arbiter of the federal constitutional rights of prisoners, particularly
those convicted of state crimes and held in state prisons. We now know that innocent people
are convicted and can spend decades in prison.5 Those cases have prompted increased scrutiny
of police investigation and prosecutorial practices. Historically, federal habeas corpus hearings
have been an important forum where evidence of misconduct by state police and prosecutors has
been developed, particularly in death penalty cases.6 Federal courts have also frequently examined
the constitutionality of prison conditions, including rape and deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs, and have issued both injunctive relief and monetary awards for unconstitutional
conditions.7
However, two broad statutes, passed during a single week in April 1996, erected formidable
barriers to prisoners’ access to federal courts. First, on April 24th, in reaction to the bombing
of the federal building in Oklahoma City, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).8 Though targeted at streamlining federal mechanisms used to
challenge the death penalty, the statute’s expansive reach extends to all criminal cases. Significant
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See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners
in Supermax Units, 15 Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Comparative Criminology 6 (2008).
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	As of May 7, 2016, the National Registry of Exonerations had identified 1,781 exonerations since 1989. The vast
majority of these have been non-DNA cases. See National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations By Year: DNA
and Non-DNA, U. Mich. L. Sch., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx
(last visited May 7, 2016).
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	28 U.S.C. § 2254 authorizes federal courts to review the constitutionality of state convictions.
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives federal courts jurisdiction over these claims.
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Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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provisions codified and intensified common law exhaustion and procedural default requirements,
and imposed a one-year deadline for the filing of a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the
constitutionality of a conviction.9
Two days later, Congress passed a second statute with broad implications for prisoners. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)10 erected new and daunting barriers to federal civil litigation of
unconstitutional prison conditions. The statute requires prisoners to file timely prison grievances
and to fully exhaust all available remedies before filing a federal action.11 It also modified in
forma pauperis provisions that now require prisoners challenging prison conditions to pay a $350
federal civil filing fee, regardless of indigence.12 Significantly, the PLRA also limits the power of
federal courts to grant prospective injunctive relief, assumes that all prospective relief will end in
two years,13 and erects new barriers to settlements enforceable in federal court.
Both AEDPA and the PLRA have deprived people in prison of access to justice. AEDPA privileges
finality and efficiency by elevating state evidentiary records and the decisionmaking of state court
judges. This expeditious review, which accords excessive deference to actors who operate in forums
with incentives to defend prosecutorial action, has effectively deprived prisoners of an objective
and independent review of their convictions. Simultaneously, the PLRA has erected barriers to
civil actions filed by prisoners. At the front end, it has increased filing fees, required complete
exhaustion of all internal prison remedies and injected initial screening of prisoner complaints.
At the back end, it discourages even meritorious litigation by limiting prospective injunctive relief
and reducing attorney fee awards.
A. Restrictions on Habeas Corpus Deny Prisoners A Federal Forum to
Challenge Their Conviction
The historical roots of federal habeas corpus, commonly referred to as the Great Writ, are well
known. Enshrined in the American Constitution but famously suspended during the Civil War,
habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts over state prisoners was established by the Judiciary
Act of February 5, 1876. Almost one hundred years later, in Fay v. Noia, Justice Brennan traced
this history and the centrality of the writ to “the unceasing contest between personal liberty and
government oppression.”14
In this pre-AEDPA case, Mr. Noia was convicted with Santo Caminito and Frank Bonino of
felony murder.15 The only evidence against each defendant was his signed confession.16 Caminito
and Bonino appealed unsuccessfully but were later released when their confessions were found to
have been coerced in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 Mr. Noia did not appeal, but the

	28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
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	Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).

	42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a).

12

28 U.S.C. § 1915.

13

18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1).
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Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 392, 400-401 (1963).
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Id. at 394.

	
Id. at 395.
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parties stipulated to the coercive nature of his statement during post-conviction proceedings.18
The federal trial court denied Mr. Noia’s habeas petition for failure to exhaust his claim
through direct appeal.19 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that Americans
soundly condemn the “satanic conditions” under which the statement was taken when they are
employed by a totalitarian regime.20 After reviewing the history of habeas corpus at length and
acknowledging the need to balance this great constitutional privilege against the demands of
federalism, the Supreme Court found that federal courts have the power and the duty to provide
the “ultimate remedy” of habeas corpus relief when the States withhold it.21 Thus, the Court
ultimately held that federal habeas jurisdiction was not defeated by procedural defaults during
state court proceedings.22 As a result, habeas petitioners were granted access to federal court if
they could establish that they had not deliberately bypassed state mechanisms for relief.23
With a change in administration and new appointments to the United States Supreme Court,
the law governing federal habeas corpus shifted dramatically.24 Decisions during the intervening
years have steadily eroded the principles that animated Fay v. Noia. In the 1991 case Coleman v.
Thompson, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Fay’s standard allowing federal habeas petitions
absent deliberate bypass of state procedure, and required petitioners to demonstrate both cause
and prejudice for any state procedural default.25 Five years later, Congress codified these changes
in AEDPA, articulating a clear preference for efficiency and finality.
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 imposes several limits on a federal court’s ability to
grant habeas relief to a state prisoner.26 A federal habeas corpus petition must be filed no later than
one year after the challenged state conviction becomes final.27 The exhaustion and procedural
default provisions of AEDPA are daunting and a navigational challenge for even experienced
habeas counsel.28 A narrow gateway through these requirements exists for those who can establish
a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” but they must meet the extremely demanding standard of
actual innocence.29 These cases are “rare,” and require a petitioner “to persuade the district court
that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.”30
18

Id. at 395-96.
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Id. at 396, n.2.
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Id. at 441.
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	See Michael Graetz & Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial Right 65-74 (forthcoming 2016)
(Chapter 3, “Shrinking the ‘Great Writ’”) for a summary explication of these developments during the Burger Court
years.

24

	Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991).

25

	Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

26

	28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(A). Under certain circumstances, a petitioner can file a timely petition within one year after new
evidence is discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)(D).

27

	While some prisoners have a right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, no petitioner has that right in
federal habeas court.

28

	See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (showing of actual innocence can excuse procedural default); House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518 (2006) (applying Schlup in post-AEDPA context); McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924
(2013) (actual innocence showing overcomes one-year AEDPA time bar).

29

	Schlup, 513 U. S., at 329.
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For the few who manage to file timely petitions, exhaust their state remedies and avoid procedural
default, explicit deference to state court findings almost always poses an insurmountable barrier to
federal review.31 AEDPA requires a federal habeas petitioner to establish either (1) that the state
court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law, or (2) that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.32 Recent interpretation of this
provision has confirmed that federal habeas jurisdiction must be evaluated and determined based
solely on the state court record and that enormous deference must be accorded to state court
decisions.33
An empirical study of habeas litigation in federal trial courts during the first ten years after AEDPA
called into question whether the statute had accomplished its stated goals of reducing delay and
achieving finality in habeas litigation.34 The average time from state conviction to federal filing
in non-capital cases increased, and the number of claims per petition significantly increased.35
However, the statute did severely restrict federal litigation. Twenty-two percent of the noncapital cases were dismissed as time-barred, and depositions or mental or physical examinations
were ordered as discovery in only .3 percent of non-capital cases.36 While only 1 percent of all
petitioners in non-capital cases had been granted relief before AEDPA, courts granted relief in
only 7 of 2384 of the non-capital cases reviewed during the decade after AEDPA was enacted: a
relief rate of 0.29 percent.37
B. T
he PLRA Severely Limits Federal Challenges to Unconstitutional
Conditions of Confinement
Challenges to state prison conditions are typically brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than
by way of habeas corpus.38 Federal courts began examining state action that violated federal
constitutional rights when the Supreme Court revitalized Section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.39
Faced with the vivid scene of a family rousted out of bed in the middle of the night and made to
stand naked in their living room while 13 police officers ransacked their home, the Monroe Court
held that Section 1983 was available for the vindication of federal rights, even if the conduct
violated state law for which a state remedy existed. It did not take long for the Court to extend
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Cullen, 563 U.S. 170.
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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Cullen, 563 U.S. 170.
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	Nancy J. King et al., Executive Summary: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts (2007), available at http://cdm16501.
contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/102.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5-6.

37

	Id. at 9. Both the rate of evidentiary hearings and the rate at which relief was granted were much higher in capital
cases, where petitioners are far more likely to have counsel. Id. at 5. Federal evidentiary hearings were held in only
.41 percent of non-capital cases while evidentiary hearings were granted in 10 percent of the capital cases. Id. at
5. Relief was granted in 1 out of 8 capital cases. Id. at 10.

38

	The line between habeas and civil rights litigation has evolved and is now defined. Challenges to the fact or duration
of confinement that seek release as the ultimate remedy are cognizable in federal habeas while challenges to
conditions of confinement may be brought under Section 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994);
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).

39

	365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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that paradigm beyond the arrest context in order to examine unconstitutional prison conditions.40
During the next 25 years, individual and systemic litigation was successfully brought to challenge
a broad range of prison conditions,41 but criticisms of the effect on federal court dockets began to
mount. State correctional officials, who were often the target of that litigation, argued vigorously
that they were being micromanaged by federal courts and forced to litigate thousands of
“frivolous” claims.42 Sympathetic to the position that these issues were better resolved at the state
level, Republican politicians incorporated a proposal to stop frivolous prison litigation into their
“Contract with America” in 1994. Congress finally passed the PLRA, which specifically targeted
Section 1983 prison conditions cases.
Addressing concerns about the large number of frivolous federal lawsuits filed by prisoners,43
the PLRA contained initial screening provisions that allow federal courts to dismiss civil actions
filed by prisoners before requiring the state to respond.44 The “three strikes” provision also bars
prisoners who have had three frivolous cases dismissed from filing in forma pauperis unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.45
The PLRA exhaustion requirements have been among the most significant and effective
deterrents to prison condition litigation.46 Although the Supreme Court had definitively rejected
an argument that state administrative exhaustion should be required before litigation of federal
constitutional claims could be brought under Section 1983, the PLRA legislatively reversed that
holding for prisoners.47 After allowing the lower courts to debate the statutory language, the
Supreme Court held that the PLRA exhaustion provisions applied to “all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”48 And in 2005, the full weight of PLRA “total
exhaustion” was announced.49 Detained juveniles, who have been repeatedly raped and assaulted
with the knowledge and assistance of guards, must now comply with exacting prison procedures
40

	Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 446 (1964); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (holding resort to state administrative
remedies was not necessary to entitle petitioner to relief under Section 1983).

41

	See e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need states
an Eighth Amendment violation that is cognizable under Section 1983); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
(prison officials may be held liable under Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement);
Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia, et al. v. District of Columbia, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).

42

	A case widely described as a federal lawsuit over chunky peanut butter was touted as the archetypal example.
Examination of the litigation record revealed that it raised serious due process issues of constitutional dimension.
Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brooklyn L. Rev. 520 (1996).

43

	In 1995, prisoners filed nearly 40,000 cases or almost one fifth of the federal court civil docket; plaintiffs prevailed
in fewer than 15 percent of those cases. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1558, n. 3 &
4 (2003).

44

	28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

45

	28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Coleman-Bey v. Tollefson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015).

46

	42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

	Editor’s Note: The Supreme Court’s decision on exhaustion in Ross v. Blake, No.15-339, 2016 WL 3128839 (U.S.
June 16, 2016), came down as this publication was going to press.
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Compare Patsy v. Board of Regents for the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

48

	Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

49

	Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). Although the Court held exhaustion to be an affirmative defense rather than
a jurisdictional requirement that must be pled by the plaintiff prisoner, forms provided by pro se offices routinely
ask for information about exhaustion.

Impact: Collected Essays on Expanding Access to Justice

even if that requires filing a grievance within 48 hours, as do women prisoners who must file
timely grievances about a pattern of rape and harassment even if they correctly fear retaliation
after filing such complaints.50
Injunctive relief, successfully achieved through systemic challenges to prison conditions before
the PLRA, is now difficult to achieve either through litigation or settlement – and the scope of
relief is limited. The statute requires prospective injunctive relief to be supported by findings, to
be narrowly drawn, to extend no further than is necessary to correct a violation of federal rights
and to be the least intrusive means of doing so.51 Parties can and sometimes do stipulate that the
requirements have been met,52 but the statute is designed to direct parties to private agreements
enforceable in state court rather than to federal court enforcement.53 Continuing jurisdiction to
oversee implementation of federal consent decrees has become rare.
Constitutional standards are demanding and violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights has
become increasingly difficult to prove. But egregious violations of basic human dignity continue
to occur. Persistent and creative lawyers have used the limitations imposed by the PLRA to forge
successful litigation strategies. Brown v. Plata54 and Nunez v. City of New York exemplify that
meaningful relief remains possible.
In Plata, the statutory cap on permanent injunctive relief became a frame for relief. A threejudge panel, required by the PLRA when a prisoner release order is sought,55 determined that
overcrowding had caused the Eighth Amendment violation of the prisoners’ right to constitutional
medical care. It took more than two decades and eighty remedial orders to develop an adequate
factual record in that case. Notwithstanding the stark finding that, due to overcrowding, an
average of one prisoner dies of avoidable negligence in California prisons each week,56 the state
litigated PLRA issues through the Supreme Court. Implementation of the order that California
reduce its prison population to 137 percent of rated capacity has been hard fought and slow.57
Nunez was the sixth successive class action lawsuit in 25 years that challenged the use of excessive
force, and unconstitutional deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm from that
force, at the New York jails on Rikers Island.58 The fifth case, Ingles v. Toro, was resolved by the
PLRA preferred Private Settlement Agreement mechanism that was enforceable in state court.59
Unconstitutional conduct continued to occur and five years after the Ingles private settlement
50

	
Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

51

	18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) & (b)(2). A common feature of pre-AEDPA settlements was a statement that the agreement was
not predicated on a finding or concession of constitutional violation. That approach enabled parties to compromise
and achieve meaningful relief without costly and lengthy litigation.

52

See, e.g., Consent Judgment at 58, Nunez v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (LTS) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2015).

53

18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2).

54

563 U.S. 493 (2011).

55

	18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).

56

	Plata, 563 U.S. at 507-08.

57

	
See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Voices from the Field: How California Stakeholders View Public Safety Realignment (Stanford
Criminal Justice Center Working Paper 2014), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programsand-centers/stanfordcriminal-justice-center-scjc/california-Realignment; see also Prison Law Office, California’s
Prison Crowding Reduction Plans and Credit Laws (updated Mar. 16, 2016), available at http://prisonlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/pop-reduction-credit-laws-info-letter-March-2016-final.pdf.

58

	Amended Complaint ¶ 2, Nunez v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (LTS) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. filed May 24, 2012).

59

See Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp.2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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agreement was approved, the same lawyers filed Nunez. The parties recently stipulated to a federal
consent order that has detailed and extensive implementation and monitoring provisions.60
Plata and Nunez are rare examples of systemic injunctive relief ordered by a federal court.
Each case required the resources of premier prisoners’ rights legal offices and major law firms
to wade through extensive discovery and motion practice. Navigating the PLRA requires skill
and expertise, but the overwhelming number of prisoner lawsuits are filed and litigated pro se.
Notwithstanding this evidence that serious constitutional violations continue to occur, the sharp
impact of the PLRA on both filings and outcomes in prisoner litigation is beyond debate.61
Conclusion
Echoing the sentiments of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, that one can judge a civilized society by how
well it treats its prisoners,62 Justice Brennan identified the “root principle” of habeas corpus as
the government’s mandate to be accountable for imprisonment.63 Justice Kennedy has recently
reminded us that the concept of human dignity is a guiding principle in prison conditions cases.64
The integrity of our carceral system depends on our commitment to enforce the Constitution.
Serious efforts to improve access to justice must include people we have deprived of their liberty
in the interest of promoting justice. •

	Consent Judgment, Nunez v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (LTS) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2015).
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Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. Irvine Law Rev. 153 (2015).

	Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 392, 402 (1963); Fyodor Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead (1861).
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	Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 441.
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	Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (prisoners who are deprived of the fundamental right to liberty “retain the
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons”).
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